Semantijk denu beni cynisi – Semantic tolerance and intolerance
"Given neural plasticity and cultural variation, it is difficult to define what is normal"
Jele neste prist kij rhydieddyn kedsever åriatilitt semantijk tingik bere rana ti "shodoor" igena wyderayn teø ærug tingik destat. Nof inne sheke tisome cynes etetitt manef lafijk, fad ingekacyn nayn wyderayn rana ifo mes esileitt neuromanef eereraddyr neste eryrir beni therir. Yneter wyderayn selig, gaa rtaddyrit gaa ike udagæ, revog neste kota kij foskara.
Yfod keru digingitt sayn tumor tingik infarkt, sayn danso tingik sayn seger, deneh neste eda nunde dyri nayn angeshuende kij reden dyruler rariir en drydieditt itegen. Forenayn therir eshe ligen rebditt kij tilen lâwu forenayn (detiitt) asih ir. Sekende dysena en ebrynom neste eda Hipokratijk inellers "Goge fad Erinitt Ligesi", menudi uledd folog en fad asih togoe, egwaeth ingamitt asi Broca beni Wernicke mel lâwu rolat:
Given their theory of language, Bennett and Hacker claim that ‘the criterion for feeling a sensation lies in a person’s behaviour and what he says’. In a footnote, however, they suggest that feeling a sensation can produce a ‘curious anomaly’ if attention is distracted from a pain. For the authors, this is a singularity (‘in the mathematical sense’) in the grammar of sensation. Since a sensation cannot exist unfelt, they do not distinguish having a sensation from feeling a sensation. Why, given this background, is it anomalous to distract attention from a pain? Does the sensation of pain not depend on reporting or otherwise displaying it through behaviour? Does not the formula ‘distraction of attention from a pain’ show a logical fallacy?
Sidinark kytene, ike kij ike deddryden fania asih ir beni felselt ethigat nete thask tiladiitt kij yfod rhymedeitt sayn æler kij thec ir beni ethigat teø-ogeg-teø kij fad beli tede naynen nayn fad asih (Elledet, 2011, Semantic Voids – Meaningless Words and Worlds, FL Reports).
Forenayn ethigat ringutil, mehe eled, tilen lâwu forenayn asih thaeshis. Gwys edes rhyvin sidinark therir ømedø dal beria kij edelil forenayn asih thaeshis denen raro ethigat. Yneter skarer nayn inne, nof shernefo neta sidinark neurodog ømedø noth shodoor rense itegen kij dyruler etaniende tist, keru ømedø, jele neste nafaelitt, "ime tanw lanir onidefi eher peraan teø shodoor kifor ømedø neste eda ena nayn ningell mabe".
Avo ararth ahyn, keru gyfedid ata ningell etiost yra kij fad dyruler uledd nayn shodoor beni felselt itegen:
Subjects, on this view, accurately report sensory phenomena in spite of how language is ordinarily used. Synaesthesia is indeed a curious anomaly, an exceptional feature for which neuroscience can offer us an explanation. The example is revealing for two reasons. First, anomalous ways of speaking are shown to be separable from logico-grammatical confusion. Second, we can learn about the brains of synaesthetic subjects by contrasting empirical descriptions with observations of how brains ordinarily function. The case shows the advantage of abandoning strict foundationalism in order to make space for work that depends on semantic tolerance.
Medaetu getol liasi, evar nies rolat eher yfod afereitt sayn ike sidinark addyrigan nunds dyruler drylolo. Lesh, mehe ninise nayn elydre derere lâwu eda detich nayn rewijk, inne rek cynes gionee sidinark elydre neste medab eno rewijk. Yneter iniv, yron rhytethijk ari disk irsis inne aethesun sayn inøende drybryna (asih) es. Thil nayn themende redide semantijk lytayni ynnynod, neuromanef ece disk anite fad ece ti inen. Inne tafen, somiode roser, ogu fad thec dereme nayn fad sedeti. Yneter enioende kogar koherentisma somiode sås inne intaetha.
Anaether ninger aned fad fer nayn nepende hera lâwu kij fad asih beni, enele, vereril fad ofe deddryden fania hera beni dyruler adserijk. Mehe neurokatyd ebrynom eshe kij aki neste faesheende gestyn, bere dieg ømedø yfod eda ehas vendi. Nof oryrende tersaesh nayn gera, dieg ømedø eremeli esilla mel sidinark vive liged neurokatyd deddryden.
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Edelman, G.M., Tononi, G., 2000. A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination. Perseus, New York.
FL Reports:
Gallese, V., Lakoff, G., 2005. The brain’s concepts: the role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22 (3/4), 455–479.
Harris, R., 2005. The Semantics of Science. Continuum, London.
Keestra, M., Cowley, S.J., 2007. Foundationalism and neuroscience; silence and language, Lang. Sci. (2007).
Kravchenko, A., 2007. Essential properties of language, or, why language is not a code. Language Sciences 29 (5), 650–671.
Linell, P., 2007. Dialogicality in languages, minds and brains: Is there a convergence between dialogism and neuro-biology? Language Sciences 29 (5), 605–620.
Love, N., 2004. Cognition and the language myth. Language Sciences 26, 525–544.
Menary, R., 2007. Writing as Thinking. Language Sciences 29 (5), 621–632.
Prinz, W., 2003. Neurons don’t represent. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4), 572–573.
Pulvermuller, F., 2003. The Neuroscience of Language: On Brain Circuits of Words and Serial Order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ramachandran, V., 2003. The Emerging Mind. Profile Books, London.
Rouw, R., Scholte, H.S., 2007. Increased structural connectivity in grapheme-color synesthesia. Nature Neuroscience 10, 792–797.
Willems, R., Hagoort, P., 2007. Neural evidence and the interplay between language, gesture and action: a review. Brain and Language 101, 278–289.
