Private Conscious Events and Language
S'inwèjewíal ekslòèenslís febangs, atdidìwés, anugslts, ilefràs, iwéas, gwíbaefs, id owér jìndènts ladd reven dénim, gwét wésò jìndènts ren lùt
éslòkdéblà, usòslal, id lòdeganbat luslíssùry akfríssóblà dí anrulu elsò:
Private experiences are important aspects of the fully functioning mental system. It is possible to get transformed reports about those events and it should be possible to develop appropriate theories that relate contents of consciousness, their transformations, and their report. However, it is not possible to build a theory that makes direct predictions about private experience since the outcome of those predictions cannot be inspected by the psychologist/observer.
Aeon wéory ladd flùlélì ley gwí sùéd gwét s'lòèdadè reven dénim, onslí ekslòéssòd raedd nurds, fràsdìés, vaj raedd merg yy eksdèrlìbazed idda luslíssùèat aeon dèenswùrledion ladd s'lòèdadè ekslòèenslí:
We usually do not refer to a choice unless there is a ‘‘conscious’’ choice between two or more alternatives, and this also holds for phonetic changes and semantic variations. This means language change is also a conscious process based on probability. And this probability can be computed.
Lù wéory eksdèrlìl dí s'inwèjewíal, yt is, olu yt dèéats s'orslálúsm issa s'obslikt ladd obsòrdadion, wésslíèpdion id ekseiylìdion, gwèn raz s'sùlé dilé gwí aeon wéory yt usòs lòèdadè ekslòèenslís, febangs, id atdidìwés issa ydé (sòe slàey 1971). Eddents id obslikts raedd reven dénim gwèn ludder gwí adailáblà dí s'obsòrdder ananut slajeng gwíen ésdèsúkdìéd, éindèrlòédèd, id aplòdelòèadèat liwèwúed ifeshi sdèsúkdìés yt ren slòjíwúk dí s'inwèjewíal aning s'émárding.
Wésò sdèsúkdìés ley edden gwí slòjíwúk dí s'jínds ladd ekslòèenslís, febangs, id atdidìwés yt ren émárdèd. S'jìndènt ladd reven dénim, issa wúzásòfrs id psyjìzáslests raen díld nizze sha slíndìèes, idda lùt wèéktat adailáblà issa aeon ydìm raedd psyjìzágy:
Choice and other processes that operate on conscious content are dependent on those structures that can enter the conscious state. Only those structures that can become conscious can be subjected to choice
activities. Thus, situational and social relevance determine the content of consciousness and the ‘‘ideational’ operations that can be performed on the individual’s reality.
It is intriguing to speculate that the action of hallucinogenic or ‘‘mind-expanding’’ drugs has a similar locus and effect. Changes in perceptual
processes coexist with changes in the experience of duration. It has been argued that these drugs often produce in the instant the experiences that meditative methods generate with extensive practice. It is possible that some drugs in fact slow the flow of conscious frames, and that some of the lasting effects of these drugs may be due to structural changes in control of the flow of consciousness.
Wéé ren tnu éládèd lòdeblàms raedd s'sdìdy ladd reven dénim. S'wúrst idda lié slanyléndél yn s'uesdion yt awéèan adwééssòs. Iz idda lùt onat s'gwèsò yt s'lìdìé ladd s'indèrdesládion ley aekt s'émárdèd jìndènt ladd reven dénim, gwét, lié gansógwèlat, s'akt laedis eksalèlìdion itsòlf ley a¤ekt s'inwèjewíalat obsòrdablà jìnsjíous jìndènts. Wès jìnslikdìé idda éasòlìblà edden raz s'làddel ladd lòdeslíssóng gwèlójíty, sónslí s'jìnsjíous akt ladd indèrdesláding olu’s jìnsjíous jìndènt líst okypy sòlé lórt ladd s'balèdèd gwèlójíty. Issa aeon édelt s'adailáblà jìndènt idda aldèéd ifeshi s'lòdeslíss ladd indèrdesládion. Sledden yt s'akt ladd indèrdesládion gwènslàs s'jìndènt laedis reven dénim, s'sòurslí ladd yt inuiry gwíjìlés laedis sòjìnyry immárdénslí. S'sòjìnd lòdeblàm dí gwí wòslíd idda s'wòkt yt s'jìndènts ladd reven dénim ren lùt sóléidy élòdewíjíblà ifeshi sòlé olu-dí-olu lepmang indí de derganyl émárt:
In human speech there is clearly a limit to the number of dimensions that we use. In this instance, however, it is not known whether the limit is imposed by the nature of the perceptual machinery that must recognize the sounds or by the nature of the speech machinery that must
produce them. Somebody will have to do the experiment to find out.
Edden ked wésò jìndènts yé aatys jìuslíd raedd lánslóaslà, ank wéy deéat ren lùt, sòlé wéory ladd dèenslèssóon siud gwí éuiéd.
Issa aeon édelt y ren wòslíd sem s'inwèjewíal’s obsòrdadion ladd s'jìndènts laedis raedd ed reven dénim fudd s'olu sland, id fudd s'owér sem s'psyjìzáslest laedis wéoédigwèl infénslí agwet ansò jìndènts, gansòd fudd ydèdder ydé, inkzàwèng indèdeslòkdidde émárts, ren adailáblà. Gyd ladd wésò klùwlàdslàs ley gwí usòd issa élàdant dí s'jìnsdèsúkdion ladd aeon psyjìzágy ladd jìglúdion, anugsl iz ley raedd lòènjíeiwé gwí immássóblà dí wédèrlèlu, raedd merg eksakt sònsò, s'éládion gwítgadn wésò ténu indèrlòédédions ladd reven dénim.
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