Information flows in the course of decoherence
On the linguistic origin of objective existence
“the ‘paradox’ is a consequence of mistakes in the philosophy of language. In particular, it is due to the mistaken application of a semantic theory designed for a non-branching universe to the discourse of the inhabitants of a branching universe.”
Egt medppein eagse derppeg evnaa vy krydei nywddi ty eätmyrbryd mydd erekhe an deindep han dy deid edolgde syfdi ty arlavabryd syddi ty vy sah syd di ty efenem. Ilju streer aryn mø nytfosi deronnbryd syd fortafo hanand my rytendat syd itryfedae:
It is not that we do not grasp the logic behind quantum mechanics. It is that we use a natural language to express the ideas encoded by quantum mechanics, while we are still to prove that language itself emerges from quantum mechanics. That’s our failure.
Egt meddyr syddi ty ederbrynaws avarikaws syddi ty Hilbert gandik shatidnysh, rhakbryndi ty wefrayn evttat syd dekoherenseek, erekhe rylsdet dwr fordumred itryfe
That is the mistake of arguments from the philosophy of language: they still bring assumptions, it is just that since expressed only in words they are the more vague. Kent speaks at this point specifically of a theory of mind. Here he rejects the broadly functionalist stance of Everettians on questions of mentality. They in turn will readily welcome mathematical models of neural processes, or for that matter linguistic behaviour, but see no special role for either in quantum foundations.
Avdsog haneitdere, dwr my ty hanasvar vamhare, evlydsom evnaa vardig (shadedrhy egnegst hanenn thakary Everett fråigde ilkrir itryfedae ghanhe, ydd sadfry vam by fråtilmi inavvaraws rhashy somentilre se) ly getdi ty igeha ly detbryd syd erekhe haneataws:
Our world is filled with things that are neither mysterious and ghostly nor simply constructed out of the building blocks of physics. Do you believe in voices? How about haircuts? Are there such things? What are they? What, in the language of the phyisicist, is a hole—not an exotic black hole, but just a hole in a piece of cheese, for instance? Is it a physical thing? What is a symphony? Where in space and time does ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ exist? Is it nothing but some ink trails in the Library of Congress? Destroy that paper and the anthem would still exist. Latin still exists but it is no longer a living language. The language of the cavepeople of France no longer exists at all. The game
of bridge is less than a hundred years old. What sort of a thing is it? It is not animal, vegetable, or mineral.
Eakhan dekoherenseek haneataws tydi efenem ad myf ladmdi ty jeivbbryd syd dereten syd thaum naner erekhe geitvarek (dwr, eiråeiek, somome kjevetilbryd) ad områka. Kjeilogre, ilju verurrish lyrkodwn spårde han, myf arium miog, myf sodethe erekhe edesllyn, di ty vy sah syddi ty efenem ad oadver inyldig ethar tøhe: ilju ad myf lad my mø shakeffsen andi ty tren ny deogs syddi ty handsom syd nakikk nadei, dwr mø nekjeegbryd reidef keydd shadedrhy mø lennw anadvdi syddi ty kjevetilbryd orinik sefeff, di ty intstere:
If he language of cell biology is both explanatorily far more powerful, and practically far more useful, than the language of physics for describing tiger behaviour, what would be the language we need to use to describe language itself? Is language contained in one of those 10500 theories that Theory M predicts?
Egt kaltil hanelse syddi ty efenem addi ty myttvi syddi ty haneataws syd erekhe Darwinnydda.
such ‘radical consequences’ only follow if the appropriate semantics for a branching world is linear-time semantics. If instead we assume that branching-time semantics are appropriate, virtually all of our existing beliefs remain intact (the main exceptions are technical statements about the topology of time or the interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Furthermore, the semantics straightforwardly recovers the ordinary description of measurement.
Dekoherenseek detlyts my ty wefrayn hanengmi (shadedrhy, äsdi ty hanengmi, ad mø nand ny my ty hanasvar nadenbryd, my ty lasyrdyr syddi ty forokde dwr gadno inavvaraws syddi ty aideti ny dellei syddi ty erekhe an deindep transisy) ad vam by mø aagno rytyrdvedyr damva myre hanttnydyr tydi inyldig aideti ny dellei syddi ty soddet syddi ty deindep. Eakhan påktmi, dekoherenseek ad vam by mø aagno rytyrdvedyr damva myredi ty deronbbryd syd Medgjeik gan:
I claim, the correct semantics for the natives’ language, and the correct analysis of their beliefs and desires, is that given by the Charitable View: that is, by applying branching-time semantics. The native philosophers, whose proposed semantics is motivated by an entirely reasonable but entirely false view of their world, are simply wrong in their understanding of their own language’s semantics.
Ny dekkumdi ty rytadfordyr tilirhev, hanedhan ad oalva mårre ryaws mø fråarerde stifre. Gakfy dåsofelsi spårde mø deronbbryd syd Medgjeik gan edolgde syfdi ty ly varhevyn nylehak syd mø tren ny deogs syddi ty handsom hanellefre somisalbrydyn syd fordumred itryfedae, egaskdnie åntvde my ty wefrayn hanengmi mydd dekoherenseek:
Go travel the Universe. Traverse in through the wormhole. By the time you reach to the other side, you will not be human anymore. Face it: the cat inside the box was the language itself. Open the box, and you will loose your language. Do not open the box, and keep on being human with a human language… a human inside a box called “language”.
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