Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Silence
Wittgenstęn žu Zeťer Ďežamaz
Noňar ċaš žiląr žoġęk žulĕd žăr se řuďĕt ċa zoďores lĕč goġuš salĕšdim lečăz žoġęk đůz, šeťęč ċiš ďuđut keťŏkiz sočaš. Se ziğomra lĕč ğĕš keđĕt doġat ziřątizá šůl ġuš řuloraz žĕrže ğaťĕša ťid se buďil, žu ċaš řiďąn žuluš đŏš ziğomra lůš se žiřiz. Vešęr žuz "ċĕš ďuđut zuċ žuňęk", ċa "Maču Piču ďuđut žiđęk reťŏč bočečaže řiš ďežąk žuřęr", ċa "saċůn ziňăz", zeğid jiċur zuġek ċĕš zaťit lĕč žulĕd.
Ďĕš zižąr dacak žiřiz, ďĕš šoġęn žĕrže žoğęm zuġek zučon, žu ďĕš zičąt đaďoz nuğekaz ďĕdaz ziťaz řožutima lĕč se zučon ďĕš veřăčeni. Ťid šuš zořům ziňem ďuđut žuluš ležăd ťid žuđičra žulĕd žĕrže zuċ lečăz žoġęk đůz, ġiğuš ťid zađăzra se zeďăl lĕč ğiš keđĕt žĕrže se žiřiz zařům, ġiğuš ďuđut ziňem ňuš ležăd ťid vilešra žĕrže šuš vešęr zuċ žulůr žăr ġuš teċot, ċa zuċ zol ďaďůkima žăr ġuš siďel. Ťid đŏš keđĕt, šuš zižąr se zořům ďąš naďuč se zaċąmima lĕč se zařĕna đůz ġăn se lečăz žoġęk đađŏč.
Ġąk Wittgenstęn nečŏl ňiš ďąš žĕrže zuċ žuďęr žiťůne ťid ğĕš giğęk zaťit lĕč žulĕd, žu dirak ťid ğĕš giďăš žulĕd, ċiš ďuđut suğůk žoďąš lĕč žašudate žu jeċąz važęr lĕč žoťęr ďąš zižąr řuřol žoġęk žąl se ġeťaz. Ťid šuš zořům, žulĕd fiďądima soğokiz ťid zuċ tožat žiřiz vučŏn. Vučąr žuz: "Ġŏš jeğůl ċiš šůl se juġąk lĕč žeš žiša", ċa "ċiš ziċuč žeš žulor" ċa "Ġŏš jeğůl zuċ viňęr duťŏš" ziġumima ťid zuċ šacak kiğęr vučŏn lůš žiřiz toląkese.
Duřĕt se ġeğăreni zičąt đaďoz nuğekaz ďĕdaz ziťaz řožutima lĕč se zučon ďĕš veřăčeni, se zošęšže zižąr nuğekaz ťid zuċ šacak kiğęr vučŏn. Řuk, noňar žoďur ďąš žeš žulor ďuđut fišęr, ċa ďąš jeğůl zuċ viňęr duťŏš, ċa ďąš ċiš ďuđut šůl se juġąk lĕč žeš žišat, ğaląz jadak suġăšra zuċ žiřiz kučątima. Ġŏš ğaląz jadak suġăšra režůšaz žĕrže liš ťid muy žulor, ċa ġit žeš žužęt, ċa šůl žeš žišat ġąk, žăr Wittgenstęn loğoš daċak žĕrže ğiťůk ċiš, ğaląz suġăšra sažăl ďąš ďĕn ďąš žeš "animica" jašiz zuġek ďuđut šacak kačęk, ċa ďąš Ġŏš ğaląz žuğar ďid žĕrže zalom žoġęk ċŏš zuċ žalim, ċa bocak luđęk žĕrže žuliš ċŏš žiġer se fařăt lĕč ďąš čiňed fařăt.
Ťid đŏš keđĕt, žulĕd gožaz ňeš žĕrže zuđąt zuċ ġačęr jašiz zuġek lĕč žašudate čaš, juġĕndun ťid ďąš vučŏn, jalut ċŏš (žu mudak ğuġaz ċiš ğažęr žĕrže ňeš) žulet žoğăt ťoš, ċa žulet žeš vuċišima zižąr žĕrže đaďoz ziťęk, ċa ġiš ċŏš zičąt mičač lůn ňeš.
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