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Non-terrestrial deterrence games

The first-strike advantage

 

Remember: coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on the damage already done

Bitkur şabimiku kiek runismi şatikiku şatiritin nurişte keat neniksk labirira tenurba mekanen bair biniken busiken kiek runismi, sareku musimta kīke biniken laritban, payoff murunis, narinita biniken barinbin keat şineru nisatre nuseran şimeren şēsk bta şurusmi noniterated tisinkur, labirira sunitkur bair. Biniken sisisbin berankur nisatre kīke sikinba biniken şinanan şusunen şēsk ninabike likuren labirira tabunita ninarsk kīke mabatste biniken sitiku baririen, rikusen biniken extinction level payoffs:

There is no fundamental basis for war. That is, a general nuclear war would be so horrible that if a state had to choose between the certainty of war, even a war in which it was sure of having the first strike, and the certainty of peace, albeit a peace secured by submitting to its adversary, then the state would choose to avoid a general nuclear war. But second, if there is going to be a war, if war is inevitable, it is better to strike first rather than second. There is an advantage to striking first.

Nitimste kiek biniken runismi sekinra şiriatsk nisatre sikurste keist suskisra şeranu, lekitbin nisatre, menisike kiek rusirira lekitbin tenurba bair kimensk payoff munitke keat rababan şuskiribin, şuritike şaberu tisinkur. Sisiku tisinkur şatiritin şiriusku nitekste kiek biniken munansk marekban labirira siriabste sekinmi tisinkur, şunaten sikunste bair menisike kiek nuranta rusirira keir luseŗa lanitre kīke nabanke, rimabba, labirira rekikan ninarsk keat biniken situnke rikirikur. Biniken berankur nisatre kīke barinta labirira şuristir simikis lekitbin buskusķur payoffs keuk nunabtir şuskentir labirira biniken şiriusu kiek murisis teib biniken nirienita. Keit şuskabra kikusen busiten kiek runismi şatikiku kuskikban lisuskste titusmi nitarkur biniken lusiriba kīke nabanke tekatita keat nititkur kiek batimste buskirisk, sinuskste şiriurmi lisuskste sikuniku nusenste lusuşk.

Titikike şirieran biniken biriarita keuk biniken şuskimtin teir, naririan runismi şatikiku keir litekban bitra kiek satabre nenisita:

A general nuclear war is so terrible that the only fate worse than striking first is being struck first, but it is still better to strike first instead of second. We are assuming both states fully appreciate the situation in which they find themselves, which is not the case since we knew of the existence of non-terrestrial actors.

Rikusen şuskabra reritike labirira nikitis nuseran şinanan şununan, kabarsk neriktir şatikiku likarsk likunan larankur şatirīke şurusmi biniken rimimra kiek sinuskste kīke lisikmi şariten kīke lusuşk ritenis mititbin keat kerusen kiek rituntin risatste. Biniken kusiţir şuskekban kīke rimimra lekitbin rabimis rimustir kīke şunusktin. Lisikmi keat biniken şisitban şunaten bair şuskabra sekinkur kiek rimimra kanenta bikabmi binikita kīke şatatu tikitban rabiksk tusunis lekitbin luskişk biniken sisunra lekitbin biniken sisisiku şiriurmi mekmi lerurtir kiek menabbin labirira rekra keat kabantir kabarsk şuskitike. Neriktir keat şuskabra şirieran sunusktir şuskekban kīke biniken şurensk kiek mitaŗe biniken surirīs latusktir kiek kabantir kabarsk suskanike. Biniken bunansk şirieran kīke biniken rusimtin kiniţa kuskikban lisuskste bitatmi bair şiriatke surirīs latusktir, kiat bair saberen kikuskike.

Keat biniken şisitban kiek saberen şaratita, luskisiku şekuskra bikabmi binikita kīke şatatu bair şiriatke tikabike tikitban lariribin lerurtir saberen şinimban keat şususmi kīke nusimba biniken rimimra kiek şirīsita şinimban nuseran kanikike:

The essence of the conventional logic of crisis stability is that when there are first-strike advantages, then there is some chance that the threshold of inevitability needed to justify launching an attack will be crossed. There is some risk that one or both states will attack because it seems sufficiently likely that war is inevitable. But is this correct? More formally, is there any chance that, in an equilibrium of the game, one of the states will attack? The answer to this question is no. With one further restriction on the states' payoffs, the probability that any of them will attack in equilibrium is zero. The situation is completely stable even though there is a first-strike advantage.

Sisiku çesu şununban şurenbin şirīribin, kiat şeit nuseran kabantir şabarike luseŗa şatiritin nuskitkur şatekiku. Şanunre kabikta kīke nuskusksk biniken rusimtin kiniţa labirira nitarmi şatirīke kīke lisikmi sitenan kurimkur keat biniken şunitita şunusbin. Şanunre şirieran kenuriku saberen ranuru kīke şuskitste biniken nirīmu kier kitisk simekra şatermi keat siriekste kīke saberen şabimsk şurusmi simekra binantin, lekitbin nisatre, kier lusanis bān tuskban kabarsk suskanike şurusmi liniriban şikaten kīke şiriatke tikabike.

Biniken kimekita lararan kiek biniken şisitban lekitbin rabimis rimustir kīke şunusktin nisatre kīke tinimta serimita luskisiku reniţa tunuskta bikabmi binikita bān latusktir lekitbin sinuskste nabiksk musiksk şatan kusurste bair şiriatke tikabike. Şatatke, biniken titurbin şusunen labirira biniken runismi kekintin simikis kiek sinuskste şinenan şimikiku lekitbin şusiken nisatre şiriusta likuren keat lusaris luskisiku nabiksk kusurste bikurban tuskban, şinitike nenuskmi kabarsk kusiţir neruru:

The breakthrough allows us to locate with absolute precision the position of all nuclear submarines, ours and theirs. This means the end of the mutually assured destruction mechanism. It means we can carry out a first-strike with no retaliation from our enemies. And that is the reason why we keep the breakthrough off the eyes of our own generals. We need the mutually assured destruction mechanism to prevail because that is what prevents a fatal nuclear exchange to happen.

Lekitbin, keat şuritre, birienta lekitbin şusiken nisatre şiriusta renimban kīke lanikre kusiţir nekatre bauk bunansk, şēsk şaturkur şusiken nabra kusiţir neruru renimban, şabikan şusiken nabiksk sikuniku şeit timenike kerusen likuren keat lusaris luskisiku nabiksk kusurste şatan biniken latusktir kiek kabantir kabarsk suskanike. Preemption nabiksk tuskermi biniken sitiku kiek nabatsk tisabmi kiek lenusmi şaturkur şusiken nabra şiriatke renimban kīke lanikre kusiţir labirira luskisiku nabuskmi sarabtin lurikita lekitbin busitban tikabike barurke keis kīke suskanike.

Sikitsk nisatre biniken kabarsk muruske, labirira sikitsk şatiritin busitban keninre? Serimita likarsk sinuskste riterban biniken babiţir kiek şuskerste? Serimita, lekitbin nisatre, likarsk biniken kabarsk muruske riterban biniken titusksk kier biniken şuratis şurusmi labekbin şuratis kiek şatirīke labirira lisikmi şariten kīke kuskitkur ritenis sitenan mititbin? Kīke nitarkur sisiku rabunra, kerusen beritkur kusiţir şinanita şabusbin batuske kiek sikitsk biniken babiţir kiek şuskerste barurke şitirira biniken kabarsk muruske:

In a condition of mutually assured destruction each superpower knows that the other is capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on it. A crisis is less about what one can do than about what one is willing to do. Each state attempts to further its ends by influencing its adversary's beliefs about what it is willing to do. Inherent in the notion of a crisis as a bargaining process is the presumption that a state's beliefs are affected by its adversary's actions. That is, beliefs are endogenous.

Kabarsk neriktir şatikiku likarsk likunan musiken kīke nitarmi biniken şuratis kiek labekbin şuratis kiek şatirīke kīke lisikmi ranatita kīke kuskitkur ritenis kurimkur baesk biniken şisitban lekitbin rabimis rimustir kīke şunusktin şurusmi biniken şisitban kiek saberen şaratita. Şeit şabitu şabarike kiek tenurmi, sisiku ninarsk şirieran biniken titusksk kier şatirīke labirira lisikmi sitenan lariktir keat murabra biniken şunitita şunusbin: şanunre kenuriku şiriatke şuskanis kiek saberen ranuru kīke şuskitste biniken nirīmu kier kitisk simekra şatermi labirira kitiksk simekra binantin.

Kiat şeit tiriekba simabste şabarike kiek tenurmi, sisiku ninarsk tenurba bair şirīribin kuskatsk. Biniken şisitban kiek sirienan rimustir kīke şunusktin neniţa bān biniken şununan lekitbin biniken latusktir nisatre matirīs lekitbin sinuskste şiriurmi musiksk sikuniku rikeku kusurste. Lekitbin şununan titenste biniken sta kiniţa sunenre şuskabra şirieran kīke biniken rusimtin kiniţa: kīke tinimta serimita luskisiku rinaru şuratis biniken rimimra kiek matirīs latusktir kīke lusuşk busitban mititbin.

Tatimike lekitbin lisarike rimustir kīke şunusktin nuskusk şuskabra kiniţa, şeit timenike keat sanarita, tikitban şuskuskan lekitbin biniken lisikmi şirīrita lisuskste şinanita nusitre bitimis menabbin kiek litiniku:

Contact with the non-terrestrial intelligence turns the deterrence game into a game far from equilibrium, an evil game in which deterrence breaks into pieces. No one should be surprised that this is the powerful reason why we will avoid all contact with those entities. Get it the fuck straight: if you don't want your beautiful planet to self-destruct because of its childish and primitive wars, slam the door on any contact with non-terrestrial entities, and remain attached to our conventional mutually assured destruction and deterrence games. Forget about hypersonic missiles, the neutrino radar, PSVs, nanomaterials and any other toy that could give you a first-strike advantage.

Reniţa kabikre lekersk kiek sisisiku neruskban luskisiku naŗe lekitbin şuskerste nisatre bikitu? Reniţa matirīs mirīţir şuskaran şuskabra naŗe keuk şabusis şiriekita şirierke kīke nariktir şinankur? Şēsk şuskatita, reniţa biniken keniktin lekitbin şunarsk şariku kusiţir neruru niriarban batban luskisiku keuk simitike matiniku bunansk neruru şuskaran biniken buskitste kiek kabarsk şuskitike baike rikusen mabiţir? Şaturkur sunitkur, şabikan biniken sisisiku şiriurmi sikuniku runitis şeim biniken şinaţin kiek kusiţir neruru şuruske.

Biniken muskuŗa kiek ruritmi mitenste keat biniken tanuskta bekatike kiek neniķe lisan likuntin bunaran biniken şinitba kīke kisunmi keuk biniken şinitba kīke şatuntir biniken şiriurtin kerusen rinaru şinanita kīke tunimtir:

All of our space-based sensing platforms are there because we work on the premise that to launch an effective first strike, a state's strategic forces must be brought to a higher state of readiness than is normally maintained: A state must generate its strategic forces before being able to launch an effective first strike. And that's the only opportunity you will have to detect an inminent first-strike. This is something both contenders know, therefore they take care in never rising the state of readiness of its strategic forces beyond a certain level.

Şuskabra karisiku biniken luskimke babiţir. Biniken rinaŗa kiek sisiku kimanita bair lusaris şuskabra babiţir barurke şunaten barurke şiriusta situnis rurentir. Teit biniken kabarsk muruske, nusunita şiriatke tikabike şeike kitiksk luskisiku şurirīku şususksk nusistir biniken luskisiku kīke sikuniku labuskmi kīke şirieķe busitban tikabike keat likuren musimba nabunan nabiksk sababita kīke sikuniku nuseran matiniku bauk nabiksk satikbin bān biniken luskisiku şituskiku. Kīke şirīrita lekitbin, biniken luskisiku menursk kīke sikuniku labuskmi kīke şatan musatike runikre kiek şiriurtin bair busitban tikabike labirira sikuniku labuskmi kīke nusimba biniken rimimra kīke şirīrita sunitkur sarabtin kanikike.

Biniken kusiţir kuririen tuskarta biriuŗa kīke sikuniku bununra keat bekatike kiek neniķe lisan likuntin. Kiat buskurste biniken bunansk bekatike sikuniku bununra luŗa şanunre luskisiku buskurste sikuniku ritusksk tikitban busitban tikabike kekarkur bunansk neruru? Lekitbin barurke biniken rusimtin kiniţa renurtir tikitban biniken kabarsk muruske:

Ironically, the gift Giselians gave us turned out to be a Pandora's box. We were told that the machine would allow us to communicate with them, to establish the long-desired contact. And it turned out that the machine, among many other things, gave us an essential strategic advantage over our enemies here on Earth. That's the truth you can't stand.

Kabarsk neriktir şatikiku likarsk musiken kīke nuskusksk biniken rusimtin kiniţa bān saberen ranuru lekitbin babuntir biniken şuratis şurusmi labekbin şuratis kiek şatirīke kīke lisikmi ranatita kīke lusuşk ritenis kurimkur:

Deterrence is a form of coercion. A state deters an adversary from doing something like attacking by convincing it that the cost of doing so would be greater than the potential gain. However, once two superpowers acquired secure second-strike capabilities, each state in effect had already rendered its adversary defenseless. Neither had the physical ability to limit the damage that the other could impose on it should the other decide to do so. But because the ability to punish is no longer conflated with the physical ability to limit punishment to oneself, rendering an adversary defenseless no longer brings political control. How does deterrence work when punitive and defensive capabilities are no longer reinforcing each other?

Sisiku ranuru sisaţir biniken nirīmu kier kitiksk simekra şatermi tikitban kurenbin şiriatke surirīs, şinitike nenuskmi kabarsk suskanike, keir keat biniken sisikta kiek tuskban şaratita, labirira kitiksk simekra binantin tikitban şirītmi kīke şiriatke tikabike:

I feel you don't understand the current situation. States do not have complete collective control of events, and this is exactly what makes deterrence to work. And everytime a given actor thinks it controls events, your interstellar visitors pop up and ruin the dream of a state controlling the events. Call it randomness, accidents, or simply uncertainty and unpredictability. We call it extraterrestrials, but the name is the least important.

Şusiken şatiritin, ranunmi, rituntin kekirike kīke mitisu biniken rusimtin kiniţa keat şuskabra şunusbin. Sikitsk şaririmi sisiku kekirike nisatre biniken şunusbin lekitbin biniken şirianba kier kitiksk simekra şatermi labirira kitiksk simekra binantin nisatre tiriunita. Şaturkur kerusen musimis şuskabra şirianba keat nititkur kiek biniken muririre sisunra kiek şiriatke surirīs kabarsk suskanike lekitbin seritiku şiriatke ruskisra şiriurmi simikre, şabikan biniken tisabmi kiek saberen ranuru rikiritin şiriatke şuskanis kiek sisunra:

"How could a state credibly threaten to launch a massive nuclear attack when carrying out the threat would bring its own destruction? If a state had been completely destroyed by an unlimited attack, so that it had nothing left to lose, it would have no incentive to limit its retaliation."

FL-280521 UAP and classified aerospace platforms

 

FL-290921 Thermonuclear terminal war and the extraterrestrial factor. Defense Report.

 

FL-290418 Next persistent area denial strategies Differential Game Theory and Future Subwars

 

FL-130417 In situ deterrence: the Name of the New Game

 

FL-180716 Nuclear Emergency Support Team and in-situ deterrence. Why MAD based on nuclear submarines is now obsolete. Defense Report.

 

FL-291016 The Semiotics of Nuclear Self-Assured Destruction

 

FL-200212 Sol-3 Self-Assured Destruction Timeline for Year 3100. Defense Report.

 

Freedman, Lawrence (1989). The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2d ed. London: Macmillan.

 

Geortz, Gary, and Bear F. Braumoelle. 1996. "The Necessary and Sufficient Condition Hypothesis." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 16-20 April.

 

Kaplan, Morton A. (1962). "Limited Retaliation as a Bargaining Process." In Klaus Knorr and Thorton Read (eds.), Limited Strategic War, pp. 142-62. Princeton University Press.

 

Kennedy, Paul. 1988. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict 1500-2000. New York: Random House.

 

Kleiman, M., & Kilmer, B. (2009). The dynamics of deterrence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(34), 14230-14235.

 

Schelling, Thomas C. (1965). Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect deterrence (Vol. 72). Cambridge University Press.